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Comments
ACCESS TO PUBLIC UTILITY COMMUNICATIONS:
LIMITS UNDER THE FIFTH AND
FIRST AMENDMENTS
Proposals to allow consumer groups access to public utility bill-
ing envelopes are currently before state legislatures and adminis-
trative agencies. Access to utility mailings will allow representa-
tive groups to communicate with utility ratepayers and to provide
organized and informed representation before regulatory commis-
sions. However, laws giving speakers access to space inside the
utility's billing envelopes reduce the utility's ability to use the
space. This Comment focuses on utility property rights and speech
rights and analyzes the validity of access to utility mailings.
INTRODUCTION
Recently commentators and legislators have sought public access
to public utility communications." Commentators favor access be-
cause of the potential dangers of utility political advocacy.2 Legisla-
tors have proposed public access to provide consumers with better
information about energy issues and more effective representation
1. The terms "public access" and "mandated access" indicate any legislatively orjudicially imposed rule forcing a utility to allow public groups to use the utility's commu-
nication media to present the group's viewpoints. In the broadcasting field, the FCC's
fairness doctrine is an example of legislatively-mandated access rights. Under this doc-
trine, a broadcaster must provide fair coverage to each side of public issues. See Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1969). Another example of legis-
latively-mandated public access is the Citizens Utility Board, enacted by statute in Wis-
consin. See infra note 10 and accompanying text.
2. A utility's state created monopoly status gives utility speech an advantage over
speech from sources not guaranteed the same state aid. See Harrison, Public Utilities in
the Marketplace of Ideas: A "Fairness" Solution for a Competitive Imbalance, 1982
Wis. L. REV. 43, 45; Comment, Public Utility Bill Inserts, Political Speech, and the
First Amendment: A Constitutionally Mandated Right to Reply, 70 CALiF. L. REV.
1221, 1226-27 (1982).
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before regulatory agencies.3
Utility political speech is accorded a special status in the market-
place of ideas.4 Although a utility is a state-created corporation
which enjoys monopoly status, its political comment is protected
under the first amendment. 5 Because states may not restrict utility
speech, commentators have proposed methods of ensuring that alter-
native views are heard. One writer has argued that, when utilities
insert political messages into their billing envelopes, a public forum
is created and a right of reply is constitutionally required.' Another
writer suggests a fairness doctrine similar to that used in broadcast-
ing be applied to public utilities. Any utility political comment
would create an opportunity for public rebuttal.
Public access to utility billing envelopes has been proposed in
many state legislatures, but has passed in only one.6 In 1979, Wis-
consin enacted a Citizens Utility Board (CUB) to represent utility
ratepayers.9 The Wisconsin CUB has access to utility billing enve-
lopes four times per year to inform consumers on utility issues and to
solicit financial support for CUB endeavors. 10 A concept similar to
CUB is being tested on a regional basis by the California Public
3. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 199.02 (West Supp. 1983).
Access to utility mailings allows consumer groups to communicate easily with ratepay-
ers to organize a strong and informed voice before regulatory agencies. Extra-agency
participation in the administrative process fosters a better balance in administrative deci-
sions by offering a greater range of ideas and alternatives. See Gellhorn, Public Partici-
pation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 381 (1972). Extra-agency input
is especially important to offset a regulatory agency's inherent bias toward the subject of
regulation. Regulatory commission leaders are most often businessmen who identify with
the values and beliefs of those whom they regulate. See Munkirs, Ayers & Grandys,
Rape of the Rate Payer: Monopoly Overcharges in the 'Regulated' Electric-Utility In-
dustry, 8 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 57, 64 (1976).
4. See Harrison, supra note 2, at 45.
5. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 n.1 (1980).
6. See Comment, supra note 2. The writer contends that public utility mailing
practices should be found to constitute state action. State agencies, which regulate utili-
ties, authorize utility mailing procedures. Moreover, a utility's monopoly status is con-
ferred by the state. Because of this close nexus between state and utility, utility political
speech is imbued with state action. Id. at 1240-47. But cf. Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (no state action present when public utility terminated
electric service for nonpayment). Assuming state action is found, fairness requires that
opposing viewpoints be heard when a utility uses a state-created forum for political pur-
poses. Comment, supra note 2 at 1248-56. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92 (1972).
7. See Harrison, supra note 2, at 65-72. Professor Harrison proposes that utilities
be required to allow billing envelope access to anyone willing to pay the marginal cost of
postage. He suggests the fairness doctrine as applied to broadcasters could similarly be
applied to utilities.
The FCC fairness doctrine requires broadcasters to provide fair coverage of controver-
sial public issues and provides that the subject of a critical report be given opportunity to
respond. See Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369-72 (1969).
8. See N.Y. Times, June 6, 1982, § IV, at 8, col. 3.
9. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 199.01-.18 (West Supp. 1983).
10. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 199.10 (West Supp. 1983).
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Utilities Commission. In 1983 the Commission established a con-
sumers board to represent ratepayers and ordered a utility company
to grant the board access to the utility's billing envelope.11 The Cali-
fornia measure is distinctive because it was administratively enacted
and is limited to an area serviced by only one utility.
This Comment analyzes the validity of state-enforced access to
public utility communications. A central issue in reviewing any
state-mandated access is whether the state's police power has been
exercised within federal constitutional boundaries. State-mandated
access to private property is valid if the restriction is not a taking
under the fifth amendment and does not violate any other constitu-
tional provision.' 2
As private entities, public utilities are imbued with constitutional
rights.13 Accordingly, Parts III and IV of this Comment analyze the
impact of mandated access on a utility's rights under the fifth
amendment takings clause and first amendment free speech guaran-
tee. Before discussing the substantive issues, however, Part II ad-
dresses the economic characteristics of public utilities.
THE PUBLIC UTILITY
Before the twentieth century, public utilities often competed for
business within the same locality. 14 However, competing companies
soon found merger necessary to avoid ruinous price wars and costly
duplication of generating and transmitting facilities.'5 Competition
was impractical because of the large initial and continuing capital
11. Center for Pub. Interest Law v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., Cal. P.U.C. Dec.
No. 83-04-020 (1983). The Center for Public Interest Law petitioned the California
Public Utilities Commission (PUC) for permission to use extra space inside San Diego
Gas and Electric's (SDG&E) billing envelopes. The Center proposed to create a corpora-
tion, Utilities Consumer Action Network (UCAN), staffed by a board elected by rate-
payers to represent SDG&E ratepayers before the PUC. The Commission allowed
UCAN access to the utility's billing envelope four times per year to solicit SDG&E
ratepayers to join UCAN.
12. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). In PruneYard,
the Supreme Court upheld the California Supreme Court's interpretation of the state's
constitution which guaranteed handbillers access to a privately owned shopping center.
The Supreme Court tested the state's access decision by analyzing its impact on the
shopping center owner's rights under the first amendment free speech guarantee and the
fifth amendment takings clause. Id. at 80-88. This Comment is patterned after the ap-
proach taken in PruneYard.
13. See Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396
(1886) (public utilities are "persons" within the intent of the fourteenth amendment).
14. See 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 117 (1971).
15. P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 16 (1964).
investment needed to provide customers with constant service. 16 By
combining, companies took advantage of the economies of scale and
spread costs over a larger market.'7
By the turn of the century utilities were recognized as natural mo-
nopolies.18 Natural monopolies can supply their services most effi-
ciently when only one firm operates in a given market.' 9 Because
utilities are not subject to forces of a competitive market, states
feared potential monopoly abuse.2 0 To avoid oppressive pricing, yet
achieve the economy of a natural monopoly, states established regu-
latory commissions as substitutes for competition.2"
Utility commissions are empowered to prescribe reasonable utility
rates and standards.22 Although utilities are guaranteed a profit,23
regulatory commissions can exercise discretion over which utility ex-
penditures are operating expenditures chargeable to ratepayers.24
Improper utility expenditures are not considered for rate making
purposes and are borne by the utility's shareholders.2 Advertising
expense, which the commission does not regard as a direct benefit to
ratepayers, generally may not be included as an operating cost.26
Additionally a utility may not include in its operating expense any
expenditures which directly or indirectly are used for political
16. See 2 A. KAHN, supra note 14, at 119-20.
17. Id. at 117. In economies of scale the cost of each unit becomes cheaper as the
firm produces more units. See 1 A. KAHN, supra note 14, at 21.
18. See M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, PUBLIC UTILITIES: REGULATION, MANAGE-
MENT AND OWNERSHIP 13 (1973).
19. A natural monopoly exists when the entire demand of a market can be satisfied
at the lowest cost by one firm. If such a market contains more than one firm, the firms
will either merge or will consume more resources than necessary. Posner, Natural Mo-
nopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 548 (1969).
20. See 1 A. KAHN, supra note 14, at 27-28.
21. See M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, supra note 18, at 13. Most commissions were
established between 1900-1915. Id.
In a capitalist system, regulation conflicts with the predisposition toward free enter-
prise. The grave attitude with which scholars viewed the decision to regulate is exhibited
by a 1911 statement made by Harvard economist F.W. Taussig: "It is not too much to
say that the future of democracy will depend on its success in dealing with the problems
of public ownership and regulation." Quoted in C. CLAY, THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES vii (1932).
22. See M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, supra note 18, at 89-90.
23. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 547 (1898). A utility is permitted a "fair return
upon the value of that which it employs for the public convenience." Id.
24. P. GARFIELD & W. LOvEJOY, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 47 (1964).
25. M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, supra note 18, at 94-97. Only operating expenses,
defined by the commission, can be recovered by the utility as part of its revenue.
The traditional ratemaking formula used to regulate utility expenditures is: (rate base
x rate of return) + operating expenses = revenue. Pontz & Sheller, The Consumer
Interest-Is It Being Protected by the Public Utility Commission?, 45 TEMP. L.Q. 315,
316 (1972).
26. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 78 Cal. P.U.C. 638, 687 (1975). See generally
Note, Electric and Gas Utility Advertising: The First Amendment Legacy of Central
Hudson, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 459, 470-76 (1982).
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purposes.27
ANALYSIS UNDER THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
2 8
Although government regulation of property can result in an obli-
gation to provide just compensation, it is unclear when this require-
ment arises. The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that "[t]here is
no set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking be-
gins." 29 Added to this confused state of the law is the problem of
defining public utility property. Before the body of takings law can
be approached, the nature of utility property must be addressed.30
Defining Utility Property Rights for Fifth Amendment Purposes
Under the fifth amendment "property" is defined as any expec-
tancy or interest a person may possess as a result of his relationship
to a thing.31 Important rights which result from this relationship in-
clude the rights to use,32 to sell,33 and to exclude others from the
27. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 390 A.2d 8, 56-57 (Me.
1978) (lobbying expenses may not be included in operating costs); Boushey v. Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co., 10 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 23, 29 (1975) (incremental expense of inserting
political advertisements into billing envelope must be excluded from operating expense).
28. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The fifth amendment is applied to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 236, 241 (1897).
29. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); see also Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 175 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978);
United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952).
The disarray of takings law has moved commentators to make colorful analogies. Pro-
fessor Stoebuck said that the combined Supreme Court decisions leave the takings area
"as disheveled as a ragpicker's coat." Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Pro-
cess, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1059 n.l 1 (1980). Professor Dunham describes the
pattern of Supreme Court takings decisions as a "crazy quilt." Dunham, Griggs v. Alle-
gheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962
Sup. CT. REv. 63, 73.
30. "The constitutional concepts of 'taking' and 'property' are intertwined. To dis-
cuss one sometimes requires the making of assumptions about the nature of the other."
Stoebuck, supra note 29, at 1083. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J.
36, 61 (1964).
31. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-79 (1945) See
also Sax, supra note 30, at 61: "Instead of some static and definable quantity, property
really is a multitude of existing interests which are constantly interrelating with each
other . . . ." (footnote omitted).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-62 (1946) (low flying
aircraft destroyed use of property as a residence).
33. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922) (reg-
ulation prevented company from realizing profit in contractual right to coal).
property.34 Property ownership has been described as the bundle of
rights and interests which one possesses.35 A state's right to regulate
private property pivots largely on the extent to which those rights are
impinged.36
Because public utility property is affected with a public interest it
can be state-regulated. 37 The purpose of utility regulation is to pro-
vide consumers adequate service at the lowest reasonable cost. 8
Regulation, however, does not change property ownership.39 Inves-
tor-owned public utilities are private property.40
Recently the California Public Utilities Commission avoided a
property rights analysis when it ruled that extra space inside a util-
ity's billing envelope is the ratepayers' property and not the util-
ity's. 41 Rather than investigating utility property rights, the Commis-
sion relied on what it termed "equitable considerations" to reach its
decision.42 After the utility inserts its bill and required notices, extra
space usually exists in the billing envelope which may be used with-
out incurring added postage cost.43 The Commission reasoned that
since the utilities charge envelope and postage cost to ratepayers,
ratepayers are the equitable owners of the extra space.44 This ruling
allowed the Commission to order a utility to grant a consumer group
access to the utility's billing envelope to communicate with
34. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (public
access to privately owned marina violated right to exclude others).
35. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980).
36. See id. at 82-83, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
123-28 (1978).
37. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876). Governmental regulation has been
routinely upheld in businesses other than public utilities. See, e.g., Martin v. Walton, 368
U.S. 25 (1961) (restrictions on attorneys with out-of-state licenses); Sage Stores Co. v.
Kansas ex rel. Mitchell, 323 U.S. 32 (1944) (prohibiting sale of filled milk); Townsend v.
Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441 (1937) (setting maximum tobacco prices).
38. Morel v. R.R. Comm'n, 11 Cal. 2d 488, 492, 81 P.2d 144, 146 (1938); 1 A.
PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 3 (1969).
39. See infra note 49.
40. United Rys. & Elec. Co. of Baltimore v. West, 280 U.S. 234, 249 (1930);
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. Co. v. Wisconsin, 238 U.S. 491, 499 (1915).
41. Pacific Gas & Elec., Cal. P.U.C. Dec. No. 82-03-047 (1982).
42. See Center for Pub. Interest Law v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., Cal. P.U.C.
Dec. No. 83-04-020 (1983).
43. Postage rates increase for every ounce mailed. For example, a bill weighing
less than one ounce currently costs 204 to mail. A bill weighing a fraction more than one
ounce is charged at the next higher rate. If a utility mails a bill weighing less than one
ounce, "extra space" exists that may be used for added materials without incurring extra
costs. The Commission defined "extra space" as the space remaining after the utility bill
and required notices were included. The Commission apparently did not view the utility's
inserted messages as a required notice. Id.
44. The Commission added that equity requires that extra envelope space be used
in the manner most beneficial to ratepayers. The most beneficial use of the extra space is
one which provides the ratepayers with information. The Commission believed the util-
ity's use of the space was beneficial to ratepayers, but said that granting other groups
access would provide ratepayers greater benefit. Id.
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ratepayers.
The Commission's decision achieves desirable results, 45 but uses
questionable reasoning. The fact that ratepayers pay for envelope
and postage costs is an insufficient reason to give them rights to ex-
tra envelope space. Consumers may not take property rights to a
company's service and billing mechanism merely because they pay
for the mechanism.46 Property rights are acquired through the crea-
tion, purchase or possession of a thing.4 Under the common meaning
of the words, ratepayers are neither creators nor possessors of the
utility's billing envelopes. The Commission's decision is more simply
understood as based on the premise that the utility has no rights to
extra envelope space.4
The premise is in error. States may regulate public utilities, but
they may not act as owners of public utility property.49 A public
utility is a private property owner able to use and sell its property,
subject to state regulation.5 0 Items purchased by the utility to pro-
45. See supra note 3.
46. The principle that ratepayer property rights are created because the utility in-
cludes operational costs in rates is difficult to limit. With little effort many analogies to
unused envelope space can be made: open offices and conference rooms, unused passenger
and hauling space in utility vehicles, available storage area in utility buildings and on
land upon which the utility expects to build, and any unused capacity in a utility com-
puter might be used by ratepayers. Equipment and tools which the utility needs only
sporadically might also be available for ratepayer use.
A large part of the privately owned utility's managerial discretion might vanish if such
a principle is enforced. An agency's full use of its power to regulate management deci-
sions might be counter-productive. Confusion and shifting responsibilities which can re-
sult from dual management create a less efficient enterprise. Comment, "Management
Invaded"-A Real or False Defense?, 5 STAN. L. REV. 110, 124-28 (1952).
47. See J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 10-16 (1962). Posses-
sion is an integral element in a property right. Possession is traditionally viewed as the
union between intent to control a thing and an ability to exercise power over the thing.
R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 20-22 (3d ed. 1975).
48. The Commission's decision contradicts its premise. If the envelope space be-
longs to ratepayers, the true issue is whether the utility can have access to the envelope
space. Yet, the Commission allowed UCAN envelope access only four times per year.
See supra note 11.
49. "It must never be forgotten that while the State may regulate with a view to
enforcing reasonable rates and charges, it is not the owner of the property of public
utility companies and is not clothed with the general power of management incident to
ownership." Southwestern Bell Tel., Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 289
(1923). See also Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 34 Cal.2d 822, 828-
29, 215 P.2d 441, 445 (1950)(corporation devoting its property to public use does not
relinquish ownership right to the public).
50. It is fundamental that utilities are private property and "neither the corpus of
the property nor the use thereof" can constitutionally be taken without just compensa-
tion. United Rw. and Elec. Co. v. West, 280 U.S. 234, 249 (1930). Despite the private
nature of utility property, states grant utility commissions regulatory power which can
vide service to the public are utility property. For example, if a util-
ity has a franchise to install a power pole, then loses the franchise it
nonetheless owns the pole and may not be denied its property with-
out just compensation. 51 Like a corporation's loss of charter, a util-
ity's franchise loss has no effect on property rights.52 Utility property
rights are those of the investors and exist apart from regulation.
Without regulation, envelopes used by the utility would be utility
property. Because regulation does not transfer property rights,53 a
regulated utility's billing envelopes still belong to the utility.
Language in a recent Supreme Court decision assumes that billing
envelopes are utility property. The Court continually refers to utility
billing envelopes as belonging to the utility instead of belonging to
the ratepayers." Clearly, billing envelopes are utility property and a
limit utility property rights. California delegates to its P.U.C. the broad power to "do all
things" necessary and convenient to regulate utilities. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701
(West 1975). The powers granted to New York's Public Service Commission include: the
power to prescribe reasonable rates, examine utility accounts, enter and inspect utility
property and alter the informational format of utility bills. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 66
(McKinney Supp. 1982). For a chart listing each state commission's grant of power, see
Characteristics of the Public Utility Regulatory Agencies in the United States, 28 BAY-
LOR L. REV. 1157 (1976).
Acting within the power granted by its state, a commission may be able to influence
utility management's decision on the use of utility property. The extent to which utility
management may be regulated differs among the states. Comment, Rates Follow Ser-
vice: The Power of the Public Utility Commission to Regulate Quality of Service, 28
BAYLOR L. REV. 1137, 1149-50 (1976). Commission influence over utility management
may be limited by applying one of the following tests: In states such as California, where
commissions have plenary grants of power, the only limit might be the utility's constitu-
tional rights. See Comment, supra note 48 at 118. Courts could also choose to require
commission influence over management to be consistent with the purpose for utility regu-
lation, which is to insure the public adequate service at reasonable rates. See id. at 118.
Finally, commission action might be limited by requiring only that it be in the public
interest. See Comment, supra at 1150.
Regulation also colors a utility's ability to sell its property. One view holds the sale of
utility property valid only if the commission finds the sale in the public good. See City of
York v. Pennsylvania Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 449 Pa. 136, 295 A.2d 825, 828 (1972).
Another view holds that commissions may restrain sale of utility property only if the sale
is detrimental to the public interest. Re Laclede Gas Co., 92 P.U.R.3d 426, 430-31; Re
The Pacific Teleph. and Teleg. Co., 39 P.U.R.3d 132, 139 (1961).
In analyzing utility property rights, two observations must be made. State regulation
cannot erase the fact that utilities do have property rights. The fact of regulation, by
itself, implies that utilities maintain substantial property rights. Secondly, state law can-
not be the sole touchstone for defining property rights. If only state law were consulted,
states could gradually regulate away private property. See infra notes 54-57 and accom-
panying text.
51. See Cleveland Elee. Ry. Co. v. Cleveland, 204 U.S. 116, 142 (1907); 2 0.
POND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 807-11 (4th ed. 1932).
52. See 0. POND, supra note 50 at 811.
53. Regulatory power falls into three categories: (1) right to regulate rates and
charges, (2) right to prevent utility discrimination, and (3) right to regulate utility con-
duct to assure the public desirable safeguards and conveniences. "Beyond these matters
regulation . . . does not and from the very meaning of the word cannot go." Pacific
Teleph. and Teleg. Co. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 663, 137 P. 1119, 1127 (1913).
54. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 532, 540
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transfer of property rights is required to make them ratepayer
property.
The federal Constitution is the best guide in determining the va-
lidity of a state's redefinition of property.5 5 The takings clause is in-
voked when government transfers private property rights to another
person against the owner's will.5 6 A state's ability to regulate is
great,57 but must be limited by sources outside state law.58 A state is
not the solitary regulator of its own police power. The requirement
that just compensation be paid when government appropriates pri-
vate property is intended to curb the arbitrary exercise of a state's
power.59 Although state law is relevant in the transfer of property
rights, the limit of state power is ultimately defined by the federal
Constitution. 0 Conflict between the state's power and the takings
clause should not be resolved by attempting any path shorter than
the constitutional course.61
(1980) (the utility "seeks merely to utilize its own billing envelopes to promulgate its
views"). In his dissent Justice Blackmun suggests that states "might use their power to
define property rights so that the billing envelope is the property of the ratepayers and
not of the utility's shareholders." Id. at 556 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). If the state must
use its power to redefine billing envelopes as ratepayer property, the billing envelopes are
utility property in the first instance.
55. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980) (a state is
subject to the fifth amendment takings clause); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 556 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (the fifth amendment takings
clause and the first amendment determine the validity of a state ruling that ratepayers
own utility billing envelopes).
Exercise of state police power in public utility regulation is subject to certain funda-
mental principles. The state possesses regulatory powers, but cannot deprive the utility of
its property without just compensation. No public convenience can justify such a taking
of property. Takings include both permanent and temporary deprivations of the property.
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 662-64, 137 P. 1119, 1127 (1913).
See also Comment, supra note 48, at 113-16.
56. See Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553,
556-57 (1972).
57. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915) (upheld zoning
regulation that diminished plaintiff's property value by 87.5%).
58. Without reference to sources outside state law, private property is subject to
the argument that because states give property rights, they can freely take them as well.
Using a property owner's expectations as a guide for analysis under the takings clause is
subject to the same circular reasoning. The property owner's expectations are subject to
state manipulation and may be steadily whittled away. Factors independent of state law,
such as, equality, regularity, and autonomy must also be considered if the taking clause
is to have legal content. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 465 (1978).
59. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1218-24 (1967).
60. See supra note 55. This Comment approaches the issue from a constitutional
vantage point to construct a framework within which state law will be valid.
61. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
Analyzing Mandated Access Under the Takings Clause
Two lines of analysis can be identified under the takings clause.62
The Court has distinguished between government regulations which
are external restrictions and those which are physical invasions of
one's property. s External restrictions, which limit an owner's use of
his property, are most often upheld.0 ' Zoning laws are examples of
external restrictions.65 Conversely, the Court has been quick to rule
a taking exists when government physically invades private prop-
erty.66 A physical invasion occurs when government occupies or al-
lows others to occupy privately owned property. 7
A government-mandated access is a physical invasion of the util-
ity's property. The regulation not only restricts a utility's use of its
property, but allows others to occupy space that previously belonged
to the utility. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,8
the Supreme Court recently introduced a new approach for examin-
ing physical invasions under the takings clause.
At issue in Loretto was a state law which required landlords to
permit cable TV installations on their buildings. On the roof of
plaintiff's building Teleprompter installed two boxes that contained
directional taps connecting a half-inch diameter cable to the build-
ing. The installation was bolted to the building and occupied only 1/8
of a cubic foot of the building's roof. Plaintiff asserted that her prop-
erty was taken without just compensation and brought a class action
on behalf of all New York real property owners.
The Supreme Court found that the cable installation was a taking
and invalidated the New York law.6 9 The Court based its decision
solely on the character of the governmental action. When the gov-
ernment enacts a permanent physical invasion, the action is auto-
matically considered a taking and it is unnecessary to analyze fac-
tors usually examined in takings cases. 0 The size of the area
occupied is not considered when the Court decides whether or not a
taking exists. The controlling principle is solely that "permanent
62. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
63. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426-27
(1982).
64. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978).
65. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (upholding ordinance
restricting development to one residence per acre); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding anti-commune zoning).
66. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982).
67. See Michelman, supra, note 56, at 1184.
68. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
69. Id. at 3178-79.
70. "[W]hen the 'character of the governmental action' is a permanent physical
occupation of property, our cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the
occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or
has only minimal economic impact on the owner" (citation omitted). Id. at 434-35.
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physical occupation of property is a taking.""1
The task remaining after Loretto is to define a permanent physical
occupation. 2 It might be better understood by examining the extent
to which the occupation infringes on an owner's property rights. 3
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, observed that,when the
government permanently occupies physical property, it destroys all
of an owner's rights to that space.74 Permanent physical occupation
prevents an owner from ever exercising the right to control, use and
exploit the property.75
Arguably, the Loretto per se taking rule applies to a mandated
access doctrine. 8 When a utility must allow others to use its billing
envelopes it loses all rights concerning the use, control and exploita-
tion of that portion of property which is invaded. Because size of the
area invaded is of no concern, even the slightest access must be con-
sidered permanent if it were a continuous requirement. Mandated
access effectively nullifies every strand of the bundle of rights which
constitutes ownership of the invaded property.7e
Mandated access cases should not be considered permanent physi-
cal occupations.7 For practical reasons the per se rule should be lim-
ited to permanent structures fixed on real property. A permanent
occupation of real property is easy to conceptualize and presents few
problems of proof.80 A box bolted to a building is easier to visualize
as a permanent physical occupation than is an easement to a bay81
or a right of access to an envelope. Not surprisingly, the cases cited
by the Court in support of the per se taking rule involved permanent
71. Id. at 3179.
72. The Loretto dissenters argued that takings must be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis; therefore, the permanent physical occupation rule was not helpful. See id. at 442-
51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
73. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
74. 458 U.S. at 435.
75. See id.
76. "The one incontestable case for compensation . . . seems to occur when the
government deliberately brings it about that its agents, or the public at large, regularly
use, or 'permanently' occupy, space or a thing which theretofore was understood to be
under private ownership." Michelman, supra note 59, at 1184 (footnote omitted).
77. See 458 U.S. at 433-35.
78. Property ownership has been described as a "bundle of rights." Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
79. 458 U.S. at 435 n.12.
80. The Loretto Court implicitly limited the per se rule to real estate. "[W]hether
a permanent physical occupation has occurred presents relatively few problems of proof.
The placement of a fixed structure on land or real property is an obvious fact that will
rarely be subject to dispute." 458 U.S. at 437.
81. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
physicial occupations of real property.8 2
Rights of access are better classified as temporary limitations. In a
footnote, the Court used two cases involving rights of access to pri-
vate property to illustrate a temporary limitation. 3 The Court called
temporary limitations physical occupations of private property that
are on the borderline of the per se rule and warrant a complex bal-
ancing analysis.8 4
Temporary Limitations
Takings analysis examines various factors, including the character
of the governmental action, its economic impact and its interference
with investment-backed expectations. 5 The Court has analyzed
these and related factors on a case-by-case basis.8 As previously dis-
cussed, state mandated access to utility mailings amounts to a tem-
porary limitation. This section addresses factors important in the
Court's scrutiny of temporary limitations.
The right to exclude others from property is a central right of
property ownership. 7 A requirement that an owner allow another
access to private property is a direct challenge to this right. Violation
of the right to exclude others resulted in the Court's decision that a
taking occurred in Kaiser Aetna v. United States.88 In this case, Kai-
ser received permission from the United States Army to dredge a
waterway connecting a private pond to a public bay. Kaiser invested
substantial amounts of money in developing a private marina and
surrounding community. The federal government claimed that navi-
gational laws required public access to the marina. The Court ruled
if the government enforced public access to the marina, it must ac-
cord Kaiser just compensation. 9
Kaiser wished to exclude the public from the marina to enhance
property values in the marina development. In violating Kaiser's
right to exclude others, the government substantially reduced marina
property values.90 The impact of public access was even more dam-
82. See, e.g., St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92 (1893) (telegraph
poles permanently implanted in plaintiff's property); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S.
116 (1871) (construction of dam permanently flooded plaintiff's property).
83. 458 U.S. at 435 n.12. The illustrative cases, Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164 (1979) and PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980),
are discussed in the next section.
84. 458 U.S. at 435 n.12.
85. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980).
86. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
87. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (the right to
exclude others is a fundamental element of property ownership and cannot be violated by
the government without compensation).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 180.
90. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83-84 (1980).
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aging to Kaiser because of the expectations it developed based on the
government's approval. 91 The case of United States v. Causby92 also
focused on the harm caused by an owner's inability to exclude
others. Causby owned a residence and chicken farm near the flight
path of an airport. When the federal government leased the airport,
military airplanes flew so close to Causby's property that its use as a
residence and chicken farm was destroyed. The Court held that the
low-flying aircraft were equivalent to a physical invasion of land and
found a taking.93
Temporary physical limitations on private property need not be
* compensated if they do not unreasonably impair the value or use of
the property.94 In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,95 the
Court upheld a state court ruling that the owners of a privately
owned shopping center must allow handbillers access to their prop-
erty. Because the owners invited customers to enter the shopping
center, they had little expectancy interest in excluding the public.
The Court said that, if the handbillers were orderly, their conduct
did not impair the value or use of the shopping center.
The Kaiser Aetna and PruneYard decisions stand on their own
and are easily distinguished by their facts. As precedent for man-
dated access to utility billing envelopes, however, these cases are in-
conclusive. A court's decision could legitimately go either way.
Like Kaiser's marina, a utility's billing envelope is private prop-
erty and is not intended for public access. Governmentally imposed
access nullifies a utility's right to exclude others. Because access re-
sults in a physical occupation of utility property, appropriate com-
pensation should be paid to the utility.9
91. 444 U.S. at 179.
While the consent of individual officials representing the United States cannot
"estop" the United States [from asserting public access to private property], it
can lead to the fruition of a number of expectancies embodied in the concept of
"property"-expectancies that, if sufficiently important, the Government must
condemn and pay for before it takes over the management of the land-owner's
property.
Id. (citations omitted).
92. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
93. Id. at 264-65.
94. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83-84 (1980).
95. Id.
96. This argument might be made based on the Supreme Court's accord of stricter
scrutiny to physical invasions. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 426-38 (1982). In Kaiser, the Court implies that the effect of a physical inva-
sion is such a blatant interference with private property that it must be a taking without
regard to the devaluation of the property. 444 U.S. at 180.
The use of the invaded portion of private property need not be permanently lost to
However, the financial impact of mandated access on a utility is
likely to be similar to the impact on the shopping center. Inability to
exclude others from its billing envelopes would not depress the value
of the utility. Any adverse impact would fall short of the losses sus-
tained by property owners in Causby and Kaiser. Additionally, this
situation would be similar to PruneYard because access would be the
result of a state ruling, whereas in Causby and Kaiser, access was
imposed by federal law. Because the state has the primary authority
to define property, its decision to alter property rights would be given
wider deference by courts.
Takings analysis ultimately balances the public need for regula-
tion with the burden imposed on private property.98 To reach this
balance, the Court must consider a broad range of factors and finally
hinge its decision on fairness and justice.99 An argument for access
to utility billing envelopes is that it will increase democratic partici-
pation in the administrative and legislative process.100 Access will
also accommodate first amendment-based concerns that diverse
viewpoints be presented to the public.101
Moreover, access will not unfairly reduce a utility's expected use
of its property. Nor would an access rule cause the utility financial
hardship. Because utilities have accepted regulation in exchange for
monopoly status, their ability to use and exploit their property is di-
luted.10 2 Accordingly, standards of fairness are adjusted when exam-
ining restrictions on utility property.103 States grant utilities corpo-
require compensation. A plurality of the Court has recognized that appropriate compen-
sation can be accorded when property is temporarily or periodically taken by govern-
ment. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657-59
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. at 84. See also, Note,
The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 75, 211 n.44 (1980). ("The takings
clause is unusual in that it predicates a federal right on state law. The fifth amendment
speaks of 'private property' and therefore incorporates state law to the extent that prop-
erty law is state created") (citing PruneYard). But see supra notes 55-60 and accompa-
nying text.
98. See, Oakes, Property Rights In Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 WASH. L.
REV. 583, 613 (1981) (the court weighs the relative worth of the legislation to the value
of the property rights at stake).
99. "The Takings Clause ... preserves governmental power to regulate, subject
only to the dictates of 'justice and fairness'." Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
100. See supra note 3.
101. See infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 50. Because the public interest is uniquely affected by direct
utility - consumer contact, this area is highly susceptible to regulation. See Comment,
supra note 48, at 118-19.
103. Fairness dictates that invasions of a private individual's property receive har-
sher scrutiny than invasions of corporate or utility property. This might be illustrated by
comparing the effect of the governmental action on Mr. Causby, a private homeowner,
and a public utility. When Mr. Causby's land is invaded he can only seek relief from
government. Conversely, when utility property is invaded, the impact can be softened by
distributing any burden among ratepayers or shareholders.
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rate and monopoly status with the understanding that they will act
in the public interest.104 Practical considerations in addition to logic
influence a court's decisions.10 5 These considerations support public
access to utility billing envelopes without requiring compensation.
MANDATED ACCESS TO UTILITY COMMUNICATION
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 10
Public Utility Political Speech
In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,10 7 the Court held the
first amendment protects a corporation's right to engage in political
debate. Earlier decisions distinguished corporate speech from other
speech because of the corporation's profit motive. 08 The Bellotti
Court, however, found that the corporate identity of a speaker was
unimportant and focused instead on whether the speech itself is enti-
tled to protection.109 Considering only the speech itself, protection of
corporate political speech is consistent with first amendment policies.
In a democracy, government must not limit the information sources
available to the public"0 and must allow the people to decide the
merits of conflicting arguments."' Corporations with access to a
broad base of knowledge are an important source of information for
104. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876). Utility regulation is a two-way
street. Regulation protects the public from monopoly abuse. Regulation also insulates
utilities from competition and increases the probability of profit. See M. FARRIS & R.
SAMPSON, supra note 18, at 13-14.
105. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) (exercise of judgment is as
important as application of logic in takings cases).
106. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. ..
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment is applied to the states through the four-
teenth amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
107. 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (struck down state law prohibiting corporate expendi-
tures to influence voters on issues not affecting the corporation's business).
108. See Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L.
REV. 372, 376-79 (1979). The development of corporate political speech coincides with
the historical treatment of commercial speech. See Prentice, Consolidated Edison and
Bellotti: First Amendment Protection of Corporate Political Speech, 16 TULSA L.J. 599,
600-01 (1981).
Initially, the Court denied first amendment protection to commercial speech. See
Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S.
52 (1942). The Court first gave commercial speech first amendment protection in 1976.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976).
109. 435 U.S. at 776.
110. Id. at 783.
111. Id. at 791-92. "[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market . Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
the public.1 1 2 The corporate status of a speaker does not diminish the
informational value of the speech to the public.
In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission,"23 the
Court affirmed the Bellotti reasoning and extended first amendment
protection to public utility political speech.11 4 The Consolidated
Edison case arose when the utility placed an insert in its billing en-
velope expressing the utility's opinion on the benefits of nuclear
power." 5 An anti-nuclear group requested that Consolidated Edison
include an opposing view in its next mailing. When Consolidated
Edison refused, the group petitioned the Public Service Commission
for access to Consolidated Edison's mailings.
The Commission denied the access request, but issued an order
prohibiting the utility companies from using bill inserts to discuss
controversial issues of public policy.""' The Commission reasoned
that utility consumers receiving political inserts inside their bills are
a captive audience and should not be subjected to the utility's opin-
ions. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's
ruling as a valid time, place, and manner restriction." 7
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Commission
contended that substantial state interests necessitated the political
speech ban, and that consumers would benefit more from informa-
tion which was useful than from the utility's political messages. The
Commission also argued that the prohibition was needed to avoid
forced subsidy" 8 and captive audience problems." 9 The Court dis-
112. See Prentice, supra note 108, at 621. Professor Prentice also notes dangers in
discriminating against corporate speech:
Trends in the American political system flow likes tides in response to the vari-
ous voices and pressures applied. The pendulum swings back and forth, now
more conservative, now more liberal. Only if important voices are censored is
the pendulum likely to swing too far in one direction, throwing the system out of
kilter. If the corporate voice is silenced, there is an increased possibility that
governmental regulation and interference might go too far.
Id. at 631-32.
113. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
114. Id. at 533.
115. The insert stated nuclear energy was safe, economical, and clean and its bene-
fits outweighed any risks. Id. at 532. Other groups objecting to political inserts in utility
billing envelopes have unsuccessfully sought to include rebuttals in utility mailings. See
Vermont Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 39 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 59, 61-63 (1980) (rebuttal sought to utility's pro-nuclear bill in-
serts); Boushey v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 10 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 23, 24 (1975)(rebuttal sought to insert promoting state ballot proposition).
116. 447 U.S. at 532.
117. 47 N.Y.2d 94, 106-07, 390 N.E.2d 749, 755 (1979), rev'd, 447 U.S. 530(1980).
118. The Commission contended that ratepayers could not be forced to pay the
mailing costs of envelopes which carry viewpoints they disagreed with under the rule of
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). The Court said the argument was
irrelevant because the Commission could better allocate costs between ratepayers and
shareholders. 447 U.S. at 543 n.13.
119. An unwilling receiver of a message is a captive audience if he or she is unable
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missed these contentions, however, and invalidated the prohibition as
content discriminatory. 120 The reasons underlying corporate speech
protection apply equally well to public utility political speech. The
regulated status of a public utility does not affect the value of the
information it provides to the public.121
Mandated Access: The Need to Balance
Mandated access to utility political speech, unlike protection of
the speech itself, is an unresolved issue. The Supreme Court has
come to opposite conclusions in two cases which address laws man-
dating access to media. In Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC2 2 the
Court considered the constitutionality of the FCC's fairness doctrine
which requires broadcasters to grant equal time for opposing opin-
ions on public issues.112 The case arose when Red Lion refused to
comply with an FCC order that it provide reply time to a political
writer criticized in a Red Lion broadcast. The FCC regulation was
upheld based on the unique nature of the broadcast media. 24 Be-
cause broadcast frequencies are limited in number, those selected as
broadcast licensees are fiduciaries to the public and are required to
present unbiased views to the public.125
In contrast to Red Lion is Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo.1 26 In this case, a political candidate demanded the Miami
Herald print his reply to an editorial critical of his candidacy. Flor-
ida law required newspapers to give free reply space to political can-
didates whom they criticized in print. When the newspaper refused
to print his reply, Mr. Tornillo sued to enforce the state's statute.
The Court invalidated the statute as violating the first amend-
to avoid receipt of the message. For example, a person inside his or her home is captive
to a message emitted from a truck equipped with loudspeakers traversing residential
streets. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). The Court rejected the captive audi-
ence argument and said billing inserts were less offensive than the sound truck in Kovacs
because Con Ed's customers could avoid exposure simply by averting their eyes. 447 U.S.
at 541-42.
120. 447 U.S. at 536. "[A] constitutionally permissible time, place, or manner re-
striction may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech." Id.
121. Id. at 534 n.1.
122. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
123. The fairness doctrine requires that broadcasters give adequate coverage to
public issues and fairly present both sides. Id. at 377-78.
124. Id. at 400.
125. Id. at 389.
126. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
ment.117 The Court was concerned that freedom of the press would
be endangered if the government could overrule a newspaper's edito-
rial discretion.128
These conflicting cases are more helpful as policy guides than as
precedent for or against access to utility communication. 129 Attempts
to analogize either of these cases to a public utility is likely to be
futile.1 30 Newspapers and broadcasters are news media requiring
special first amendment consideration because they control access to
the channels of communication. 3 1 In contrast, a public utility is only
a purchaser and user of media. 32
Because no detectable difference exists between newspapers and
broadcasters for first amendment purposes, attempts to reconcile
Red Lion and Tornillo are also likely to be difficult. 33 The two cases
are best explained as resulting from a balance of competing inter-
ests.134 Access regulation offers public benefits while, at the same
time posing potential dangers. 35 The following sections examine the
benefits and dangers of access and limitations on the states' ability to
enforce an access law.
Benefits of Access
A law providing access to public utility communication furthers
the first amendment's egalitarian values. 36 Access increases the di-
127. -id. at 258.
128. Id. at 257 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). "Regard-
less of how beneficent-sounding the purposes of controlling the press might be, we prefer
'the power of reason as applied through public discussion'. . " 418 U.S. 241, 259
(White, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
129. Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 55 at 770 (suggestion that the juxtaposition of Red
Lion and Tornillo might offer a paradigm for analayzing new types of communication).
130. Public utility communication could be seen as analogous to broadcaster com-
munication. Both utilities and broadcasters function under a regulatory scheme designed
to serve the public interest. See Comment, supra note 2, at 1258. However, the broadcast
industry is unique because of the need to allocate broadcast frequencies in order to create
a viable media. See Note, Reconciling Red Lion and Tornillo: A Consistent Theory of
Media Regulation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 563, 569-70 (1976). Public utilities are neither
members of the media, nor are its methods of communication unique.
131. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 n.30 (1978).
132. See Harrison, supra note 2, at 53-55.
133. Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Par-
tial Regulation of the Mass Media, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1976).
134. By providing access in one medium and full editorial control in the other
medium, the Court has sought to achieve the advantages of both public access and mini-
mal governmental intervention. Id. at 36.
135. Professor Bollinger points out general benefits and dangers posed by access
regulation. The benefits include equalizing opportunities to speak and furthering demo-
cratic ideals. The dangers include discouraging discussion of controversial issues, increas-
ing censorship potential and risking burdensome regulation. Id. at 27-32.
136. "The principle of equal liberty of expression underlies important purposes of
the first amendment." Three purposes of the first amendment are: (I) to permit citizens
in a democracy to make informed choices; (2) to aid in the search for truth; and (3) to
promote the sense of individual self worth. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the
408
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versity of viewpoints available to the public, encourages democratic
participation in government, and tempers the influence of utility
advocacy.
By increasing the diversity of views available to the public, access
better informs ratepayers. The better informed the public, the more
capable it is of making sound decisions.131 The Court has stressed
the importance of ensuring the public's receipt of information. In
Red Lion, the Court focused on the interests of the listeners and
viewers in receiving diverse views.18 The protection of corporate
speech is based on its value as a source of information to the
public.""
Access increases democratic participation by providing ratepayers
an opportunity to organize for effective advocacy before regulatory
commissions. Representative government operates best when it is in-
formed of all relevant opinions. 40 Because utility practices affect vir-
tually every citizen, commissions need capable consumer input to
balance the informed and interested utility representative.141,
Public access also fosters a better balance between corporate and
consumer power in the marketplace of ideas. Although corporations
have a great capacity to inform the public, some commentators fear
that corporate speech overshadows individual speech.142 Corporations
possess greater wealth than most individuals, and can thwart the ef-
forts of an individual's advocacy.1 43 Because a corporation exists only
as a state created fiction, corporate speech is a state-created amplifi-
cation system. 14 4
Not only are public utilities state-created amplification systems,
First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20, 23 (1975).
137. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L. J. 877, 881 (1953).
138. "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters
which is paramount." Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1968).
139. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 n.1
(1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 756 (1976).
140. See Emerson, supra note 137, at 882.
141. See supra note 3.
142. See Patton & Bartlett, Corporate "Persons" and Freedom of Speech: The
Political Impact of Legal Mythology, 1981 WIs. L. REv. 494, 501; Note, The Corpora-
tion and the Constitution: Economic Due Process and Corporate Speech, 90 YALE L. J.
1833, 1834 (1981).
143. "[N]ext to the political power of the corporate speaker who can afford media
advertising, the power of an individual voter to influence the political process is virtually
symbolic." Note, supra note 142, at 1854.
144. Patton & Bartlett, supra note 142, at 501.
they are state-protected amplification systems.145 Arguably, the close
association between the utility and the state requires that alternative
views be included in the utility's billing envelope. By authorizing a
process which allows the utility to distribute its political comment
with its bills, the state creates an exclusive forum for utility use.1 48 It
is unfair that the state allows the utility this freedom while it ex-
cludes others from the opportunity to disseminate their views
through the same forum. 147 When a state opens a forum for some
speakers, it must allow other speakers equal opportunity to be
heard. 4 8 An access law reduces the state-created inequity by ensur-
ing that alternative views are presented in the envelope.
Dangers of Access
An access law cannot be implemented without government in-
volvement. When government involves itself in the marketplace of
ideas, a danger exists that government and not the public will judge
the value of expression. 149
When it implements an access law, the state is forced to judge
different speakers. Merely approving an access requirement signifies
the state's choice to lessen the utility's position and elevate the ac-
cess speaker's position. 150 The state must choose between speakers
again when it decides who will be granted access.
Such extensive state involvement is inconsistent with the theory of
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.151 The marketplace theory
holds that truth can emerge from robust debate when that debate is
free from government interference.1 52 In a democracy, the people
must be responsible for judging the merits of conflicting argu-
ments.153 To enjoy the liberties granted by the first amendment, the
145. Utilities are natural monopolies protected from competition by the state. See
supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
146. See Comment, supra note 2, at 1246-47.
147. Id.
148. See Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
149. Implementing an "enforceable right of access necessarily calls for some mech-
anism, either governmental or consensual. If it is governmental coercion, this at once
brings about confrontation with the express provisions of the First Amendment .
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254 (1974).
150. Utilities, even without access rules, are discouraged from making political
comment. Unlike other corporations, a utility cannot pass on the costs of political speech
to consumers. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. Because the utilities' share-
holders bear the cost, the utilities' political speech will likely be directed only to limited
issues calculated to create revenue. An access doctrine would further limit a utility's
voice by requiring it to share limited space with opposing speakers.
151. "[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by a free trade in ideas .
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
152. Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 964, 965 (1978).
153. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 (1978).
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people must risk the danger that some may not be able to properly
evaluate opposing arguments. 5
Limiting Access
Government, however, must intervene to ensure that diverse views
are adequately aired.155 The marketplace theory fails because domi-
nant groups control access to the marketplace and restrict less pow-
erful groups from establishing their views.156 By creating corpora-
tions and protecting monopolies that engage in public discussion,
government is already involved in the marketplace. Because govern-
ment has created an imbalanced marketplace, it is responsible for
correcting that imbalance. When the benefits are weighed against
the dangers, an access law is clearly desirable.1 57 The question re-
maining is how extensively a state may enforce an access law before
it violates the utility's first amendment rights.
The most direct limit to state regulation of utility speech is the
Con Ed case. 58 The Court in Con Ed held that a state may not
regulate utility speech on the basis of its content. 59 A content-based
regulation exists when the state restricts particular viewpoints or
prohibits public discussion of an entire topic. 60 A valid access law
must clearly avoid distinguishing speech on the basis of its message.
Beyond this dictate, Con Ed is unhelpful as a limiting source.
Utilities may argue that the state is regulating content when it en-
acts an access law that reduces the utility's message in order to allow
other messages to be heard. Access laws, however, do not regulate
content, but rather specify the forum in which a speaker may present
his message. The state's decision to offer the public alternative view-
points through an access law should not be confused with a content-
based regulation.
The Court has recognized that a speaker may be required to allow
154. Id.
155. See L. TRIBE, supra note 58, at 693; T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION 630 (1970).
156. See L. TRIBE, supra note 58 at 577; Baker, supra note 152, at 978.
157. "The attempt to use governmental power to achieve some limited objective
while at the same time keeping the power under control, is always a risky enterprise.
Nowhere is this truer than in the area of freedom of expression. Nevertheless there is no
alternative. The weaknesses of the existing system are so profound that failure to act is
the more dangerous course." EMERSON, supra note 155 at 630.
158. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
159. Id. at 537. New York's Public Service Commission intentionally sought to
ban only messages discussing controversial issues. Id.
160. Id.
other messages to accompany his message.161 States may create
rights of access as long as the Federal Constitution is not violated.1 62
A content-neutral access law prescribes only the time, place, or man-
ner of utility speech. A law merely restricting the utility's available
forum will be upheld if it serves significant state interests and leaves
the speaker alternative channels of communication. 6 3
Another limitation might be derived from the first amendment
right not to speak developed in Wooley v. Maynard. 1 6 This case in-
volved a New Hampshire statute that required drivers to display the
state motto "Live Free or Die" on their license plates. The Court
invalidated the statute and held that a state may not force a person
to carry messages he finds unacceptable on his private property.1 6 5
Violation of the right not to speak was particularly offensive in
Wooley because the motorist could not avoid being identified with
the message he was carrying.
The force of Wooley, however, appears limited by PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins.""' Billing envelope access is more like
PruneYard than Wooley and a court might likely follow PruneYard
in its analysis of billing envelope access. Access laws do not prescribe
the exact messages one must carry, but require the property owner
to provide space for another speaker. Unlike Wooley's personal car,
shopping centers and billing envelopes are already used for commu-
nicating and transacting business with the public. Like the shopping
center, a billing envelope offers the utility the opportunity to dissoci-
ate itself from messages inserted into utility billing envelopes. At
most, Wooley appears to require the state to allow the utility to dis-
associate itself from the inserted message. A note or warning stating
that the insert is not associated with the utility fulfills this
requirement. 167
A third possible limit is the Court's admonition in Police Depart-
ment of Chicago v. Mosley that all points of view must be afforded
equal opportunity to be heard.168 At issue in Mosley was a city ordi-
nance prohibiting picketing near school grounds but allowing picket-
ing of any school involved in a labor dispute. The Court invalidated
161. See id. at 543 (utility might be lawfully ordered to carry other inserts in its
billing envelope). See also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 386 (1977)
(suggestion that attorney advertising may be required to include supplemental messages).
162. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
163. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 535-36.
164. 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977).
165. Id.
166. See 447 U.S. at 85-87 (Wooley does not apply when a state requires a shop-
ping center owner to permit handbillers to use shopping center property to distribute
their messages).
167. The PruneYard Court noted that the shopping center owners could post signs
disavowing any connection with the handbiller's message. Id. at 87.
168. 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
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the ordinance as content discriminatory. 169 The Court stated that
both the first amendment and the equal protection clause prohibited
government from selecting the issues which are worth discussing or
debating in public facilities. "There is an 'equality of status in the
field of ideas,' and government must afford all points of view an
equal opportunity to be heard.' 70
An access law that allows both public groups and the utility access
to the envelope is consistent with Mosley's emphasis on equality. An
access law excluding utility messages, however, appears contrary to
the Court's language. Mosley directs that all viewpoints are of equal
status and that government may not assess otherwise. An access law
which excludes utility messages from the envelope indicates that the
state's purpose was not to provide equal representation in the mar-
ketplace, but rather to discriminate against the utility.
Differential treatment between speakers requires an inquiry into
the state interests served by the treatment.' 7 ' The equal protection
clause requires that statutes affecting first amendment interests be
narrowly tailored to the state's objective.17 2 Particularly careful scru-
tiny is required when government excludes a speaker from a fo-
rum.1 3 An access law serves state interests by making diverse views
available to the public and encouraging greater participation in regu-
latory decisions. These state concerns are best served when the util-
ity has access to the envelope in conjunction with ratepayers. An
access law goes too far when it excludes utility messages. Such an
access law fails to serve narrowly tailored state interests and may
violate the first amendment.
CONCLUSION
Proposals to provide consumer groups access to public utility mail-
ing are currently before state legislatures and utility commissions.
This Comment has examined two obstacles to access laws - the
fifth and first amendments.
Analysis under the fifth amendment takings clause is somewhat
inconclusive. Precedent exists to support a ruling that access to util-
169. Id. at 99
170. Id. at 96 (citation omitted).
171. Id. at 95.
172. Id. at 101.
173. Id. at 98-99. After Mosley, any "restriction that selectively excludes speakers
from a public forum must survive careful judicial scrutiny to ensure that the exclusion is
the minimum necessary to further a significant governmental interest." Karst, supra note
136 at 28.
ity billing envelopes is a taking. The Court has vowed a case-by-case
analysis, however, and equally strong arguments exist to support ac-
cess without requiring compensation. This latter option becomes the
clear choice when a broad balance is adopted.
When the burden on private property is so onerous it outweighs
the public benefit of regulation, a taking must be found. If, at some
point, an extensive access requirement interferes with the use of util-
ity property and/or causes substantial loss to utility shareholders,
Causby and Kaiser Aetna would control and a taking should be
found.
Access laws further first amendment policy by making diverse
viewpoints available to the public. At the same time, access laws en-
courage organized and informed consumer representation before reg-
ulatory commissions. Limits on the state's ability to enforce access
laws are sparse, but present. Under Con Ed, a content based regula-
tion of speech will be invalidated. Con Ed, however, does not impose
any substantial limitation because access laws are not content based
regulations. A more pointed limitation is found in the Mosley deci-
sion. Mosley emphasizes that all viewpoints are of equal status and
should have equal opportunities to be aired. An access law that ex-
cludes the utility's messages is inconsistent with the Mosley lan-
guage and is unnecessary to achieve the state's objectives.
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